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Abstract 
Using the proprietary dataset of a real estate agency, I analyse tens of thousands of housing 
sale and rental transactions in Central London during the 2005-2011 period. I run hedonic 
regressions on both prices and rents and show that price-rent ratios are higher for bigger and 
more central units. Since this result could be driven by differences in unobserved 
characteristics between properties for sale and properties for rent, I replicate my analysis 
using only units that were both sold and rented out within 6 months, and get similar results. 
I discuss several possible explanations for my findings. 
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1 Introduction
The value of the entire stock of housing stands at 16 trillion dollars in the US and 3.9 trillion
pounds in the UK,1 making housing the biggest item among households’ assets. Similarly, rents
represent the major expenditure item for many households, amounting to 20-30% of monthly
expenses (Genesove, 2003).2 The booms and busts that affect house prices are not equally
pronounced for rents. In fact, the recent housing boom was characterised by a significant
rise in the price-rent ratio (Campbell et al., 2009), and historically rents are less volatile than
house prices (Gallin, 2008), as dividends are less volatile than stock prices (Shiller, 1981).
Understanding and modeling price-rent ratios is therefore crucial to improve our knowledge of
the housing market.
In this paper I study unit-level data on house prices and rents in Central London. I document
the existence of systematic differences in price-rent ratios across property types within the same
urban area: bigger properties and properties located in more expensive neighbourhoods have
higher price-rent ratios. My analysis is based on a novel proprietary dataset from a Central
London real estate agency. The dataset contains information on achieved prices and rents for
tens of thousands of properties, as well as detailed descriptions of property characteristics. The
period of analysis, 2005 to 2011, covers the last part of the housing boom, the bust of 2008,
and the subsequent recovery.3 The area under study contains a mix of owner-occupied and
private-rented properties, which often lie side by side. Observed prices and rents are the result
of genuine market forces, because the UK private rental market is essentially unregulated.4
In terms of empirical methodology, I use hedonic regressions to estimate average prices and rents
within cells of observationally equivalent properties. Since hedonic regressions cannot control
for unobserved characteristics, and these could differ between sold and rented dwellings, I also
run a restricted analysis with properties that are both sold and rented out within 6 months. In
this way I am able to measure price-rent ratios exactly: I have enough observations to focus only
on prices and rents observed on the same property at approximately the same time. I run the
same hedonic regressions on this subset of properties and get coefficients that are very similar
to the ones obtained from the whole dataset.
The empirical analysis shows that price-rent ratios are higher for bigger properties and properties
located in more expensive neighbourhoods. The finding that more expensive properties have
higher price-rent ratios is consistent with Garner and Verbrugge (2009) who use answers from
the US Consumer Expenditure Survey to compare self-reported rents and house values. In
the UK, reports from several sources, such as the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (1996) and the
Association of Residential Letting Agents (2012), also show that price-rent ratios are higher for
bigger properties (houses against flats) and expensive regions (London against the rest of the
UK). The present paper contributes to the literature by presenting a detailed micro dataset
1U.S. data from the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds Accounts, (table B100, number 49). U.K. data
from http://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/media/pdfs/halifax/2012/1102_value.pdf
2 In 2008 residential real estate constituted 39% of households’ assets in the U.K. (Survey of Assets and Wealth)
and 29% of households’ assets in the U.S. (Flows of Funds). According to the UK Office for National Statis-
tics (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/family-spending/family-spending/family-spending-2012-edition/
rft---table-2-8.xls), “Expenditure on rent by renters” corresponds to 28% of income. In the US, the Bureau
of Labour Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/cex/2010/share/tenure.pdf) puts this number at 25%.
3Differently from many advanced economies and the rest of the United Kingdom, nominal house prices in
Central London are currently higher than in 2007 (the previous peak).
4The most common form of rental contract, the “assured shorthold tenancy”, leaves landlords and renters
free to renegotiate any rental increase or decrease at the end of the rental period (usually one year). See
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/HomeAndCommunity/Privaterenting/Tenancies/DG_189101
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and implementing a unique empirical methodology to uncover these patterns. Despite the
geographical focus of the dataset, the findings are not London-specific and time-specific; they
are consistent with previous studies which concentrated on other geographical areas and periods.
Using micro local data to infer general features of housing markets is a common approach in
housing research. For instance, Guerrieri et al. (2010) analyse house prices at the zip-code
level in a group of US cities to propose a model of neighbourhood gentrification. Ferreira and
Gyourko (2011) use US individual-level transaction data to produce local price indices and
study the start of the recent house price boom. Due to the lack of reliable data, the analysis
of rental prices at the micro local level has been so far limited, despite the importance of rents
in determining housing market conditions. Price-rent ratios have been repeatedly measured
and studied using aggregate data. For instance, Gallin (2008) uses city-level data to check if
changes in price-rent ratios anticipate future price or rent growth, as the dividend discount
model would predict. Verbrugge (2008) analyses aggregate price and rent indices to show a
persistent divergence of rents and ex ante user costs.
A notable exception is Hwang et al. (2006), who use micro data on prices and rents from South
Korea to test the dividend pricing model. Hwang et al. (2006) exploit the high homogeneity
of apartments in Seoul and the surrounding areas to compute price-rent ratios and see how
they evolve over time. By contrast, in this paper I exploit the heterogeneity of housing units
in Central London to shed light on the cross-sectional variation of price-rent ratios. While the
study of Hwang et al. (2006) relies on the very specific features of the Korean housing market,
my analysis is based on a market that functions similarly to most housing markets in the US
and Europe.
In the last part of the paper I discuss the potential explanations for the findings on price-rent
ratios. One possibility is that gross price-rent ratio differences hide differences in maintenance
costs or vacancy rates: once these differences are taken into account, it could be that “net”
price-rent ratios are actually quite homogeneous. I don’t find evidence consistent with this
view. Another possibility, related to the dividend pricing model, is that properties with higher
price-rent ratios feature higher expected rent growth or lower risk premia. Contrary to this
second view, I find that in Central London rent growth rates of bigger properties are not
different from those of smaller properties, but their volatility is significantly higher. Similarly,
rents are not growing faster in more expensive neighbourhoods, but are more volatile. This
is consistent with the hedging model of Sinai and Souleles (2005): higher price-rent ratios are
associated with higher rent volatility, which pushes people to buy in order to lock in future rents.
The submarkets where price-rent ratios are highest—big and centrally located properties—are
characterised by rental markets that are “thin” in a search-theory sense (Ngai and Tenreyro,
2009), so that finding and maintaining good matches is difficult.
I use price and rent indices derived from the hedonic regressions to estimate the growth and
aggregate volatility of prices and rents for different property categories. Using data at the indi-
vidual property level allows me also to measure idiosyncratic volatilities by restricting attention
to properties that were sold or rented at least twice during the sample period and applying the
weighted repeat sales estimator of Case and Shiller (1989). Since most people own or rent only
one property, idiosyncratic volatilities of prices and rents might be a better risk measure than
aggregate indices, but previous studies only measure rent risk at the aggregate level. Since the
expectations of agents might differ from the actual historical performance of house prices and
rents, I complement my analysis with an expectation survey that is regularly carried out by the
same real estate agency that has provided the property dataset.
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The results of this paper are relevant both for consumers and investors. Returns to housing
are given by the sum of capital gains and rental yields, where rental yields are defined as the
inverse of price-rent ratios. The finding of different rental yields across property types is useful
for real estate investors’ portfolio management (Plazzi et al., 2011). Moreover, the recent crisis
has interrupted the upward trend in homeownership in many countries such as the U.S. (Gabriel
and Rosenthal, 2011) and the U.K. (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2012).
The prospect of more concentration in the ownership of the housing stock makes these portfolio
considerations quite relevant.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents
the empirical methodology of the paper and shows the main results. Section 4 discusses the
theories that can explain the main results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
The main dataset used in this paper comes from John D Wood & Co., a real estate agency
that operates in London and the surrounding countryside.5 I refer to these data as the JDW
Dataset. Sometimes the empirical analysis is restricted to subsets of the JDW Dataset: the
Matched Dataset and the Repeat Transactions Dataset. To match rented properties with sale
transactions and to assess the representativeness of the JDW Dataset, I also use data from the
Land Registry, which contains official records of all housing transactions in England and Wales.
These datasets are described in the remaining of this section.
2.1 The JDW Dataset
The JDW Dataset includes observations from the Central-Western area of London. London
is divided in 33 local authorities, which are responsible for running services such as schools,
waste collection, and roads. The local authorities covered by the JDW dataset are Camden,
Westminster, Kensington and Chelsea, Hammersmith and Fulham, and Wandsworth. These
local authorities are shown on the left-hand side of Figure 1.
This area is one of the most densely populated in London. Most of the housing stock is made
of flats rather than single-family houses. Approximately one fourth of dwellings are privately
rented.6 Appendix Table A1 shows detailed statistics on the area, gathered from public sources.
A more detailed partition of this area can be obtained using postcode districts. In the U.K.
postal code, the postcode district represents the first half of the postcode (one or two letters
followed by one or two numbers) and corresponds to 10,000 - 20,000 unique addresses. The
right-hand side of Figure 1 shows the postcode districts included in the JDW Dataset. In the
empirical analysis, I use postcode district dummies to capture the effect of location on house
prices.
5http://www.johndwood.co.uk/. John D Wood & Co. was established in 1872 and has now 20 offices: 14
in London and 6 in the countryside. UK real estate agencies provide several services ranging from assistance
in selling properties to management of rental units. Big agencies have valuation teams whose duties include
keeping track of market trends. Agents assemble sale and rental data from their own records as well as from
other agencies.
6In addition to the private-rented sector, 30% of the housing stock is rented at subsidised prices by local
authorities or housing associations. This part of the market is not included in the JDW Dataset.
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Figure 1: Geographical coverage of the JDW Dataset
Notes: The local authorities covered by the JDW dataset are Camden (C), Westminster (We), Kensington and
Chelsea (K), Hammersmith and Fulham (H), and Wandsworth (W).
To remove potential duplicate observations in the dataset, every sale or rental contract which
refers to the same property and occurs within one month is excluded. This operation has the
additional advantage of removing short-term rental contracts, which are usually more expen-
sive than other rentals and targeted to specific markets (e.g. business travellers and tourists).
Moreover, since London houses and flats can also be sold on a leasehold—an arrangement by
which the property goes back to the original landlord after the lease expires—I drop all sales
of properties with a leasehold expiring in less than 80 years.7 Finally, to avoid outliers, I trim
properties whose price or rent is below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile of the
price or rent distribution of their transaction year. Figure 2 plots the sale observations on the
London map.
The JDW Dataset contains only a fraction of the housing units present in the whole Central
London area. In Appendix C, I compare some of the features of the JDW Sales Dataset with
the Land Registry for the 2005-2010 period. Compared to the JDW Sales dataset, the Land
Registry does not contain important information on housing characteristics, such as floor area.
The first two columns of Table 1 contain the summary statistics for the sold properties (Sales)
and rented properties (Rentals). Consistently with the composition of housing stock in this
part of London, the majority of housing units in the JDW Dataset are flats. There are more
flats in Rentals (88%) than in Sales (76%). Moreover, Sales contain a higher number of large
flats (3 or more bedrooms) than Rentals. The median floor area is larger for Sales (1,059 square
feet against 879 square feet). Other studies report similar differences between owner-occupied
and rented units. For instance, Glaeser and Gyourko (2007) use the 2005 American Housing
Survey to show that “The median owner occupied unit is nearly double the size of the median
rented housing unit,” and that rental units are more likely to be located near the city centre.
7It is commonly believed that the price difference between a freehold (i.e., not subject to leasehold) and
leasehold property is negligible for leaseholds longer than 80 years.
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Table 1: JDW Datasets: Summary statistics
Complete dataset Matched units Repeat transactions
Sales Rentals Sales & Rentals Sales Rentals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Observations 20,154 43,361 1,661 1,233 18,710
Median price 694,323 532,746 920,000 .
Median rent 460 524 460
(in 2005 £; rent per week)
Floor area (sqft) 1059 879 781 1245 863
Property type (%)
1-bed flat 0.20 0.34 0.33 0.17 0.36
2-bed flat 0.35 0.39 0.41 0.29 0.38
3-bed+ flat 0.21 0.14 0.12 0.20 0.12
House 0.24 0.12 0.14 0.35 0.14
Postocde districts (%)
NW1 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
NW3 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.04
NW8 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03
SW1 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.14
SW10 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.05
SW11 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03
SW3 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.12
SW5 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04
SW6 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.07
SW7 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.09
SW8 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03
W1 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.13
W10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
W11 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05
W14 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03
W2 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06
W8 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.06
W9 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
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Figure 2: Observations in the JDW Dataset
Notes: Property addresses were geocoded using Google Maps.
(a) Sales (b) Rentals
These facts are consistent with Linneman (1985)’s production-efficiency argument: smaller units
demand less management costs and both landlords and households prefer them for renting.
Before proceeding to the main analysis, it is useful to measure the evolution of the number
of transactions in the sale and rental market. Prices are not the only margin of adjustment
in the housing market: volumes and liquidity are also important (Novy-Marx, 2009; Ngai and
Tenreyro, 2009). Figure 3 shows the quarterly number of transactions in the JDW Sales and
Rentals datasets. The number of sales varies a lot from one period to another. In the 2005-2007
period, when the market was characterized by rising prices, the average number of quarterly
transactions was four time as high as the number of transactions during the 2008 bust. The
number of rental contracts, by contrast, appears less volatile from one year to another. However,
rental contracts display a much clearer seasonal pattern. The third quarter always has 50% more
transactions than the first quarter. For sales, the first quarter has usually a lower number of
transactions, but seasonality is less pronounced than for rentals.
2.2 The Matched Dataset
The Matched Dataset contains properties that appear both in the Sales and Rentals datasets,
with the sale taking place between 0 and 6 months before the corresponding rental contract.
To increase the number of matched observations, I also add properties that appear both in the
JDW Rentals dataset and the Land Registry—again, with a maximum distance of 6 months
between the sale and the subsequent rental. In all datasets properties are uniquely identified by
their address. For houses, the address is made of the street name and number. For apartments,
the address contains additional information such as floor and unit number.
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Figure 3: Sale and rental contracts per quarter
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For each property in the JDW Rental Dataset, the matching algorithm looks for a sale of the
same property either in the JDW Sales Dataset or in the Land Registry. Since every record
comes with a transaction date, the distance in days between sales and rentals is measured. Since
there can be multiple sales and multiple rents for each property, for every sale the algorithm
keeps only the closest rental contract. If a rental contract can be imputed to multiple sales,
the algorithm keeps only the closest sale. Since prices and rents can diverge over time, it is
necessary to keep only rental contracts that were signed shortly after the sale of the property. I
choose 6 months as the cutoff distance between the sale and the rental. My window around the
sale date is asymmetric in the sense that I do not select rental contracts signed a few months
before a sale.
Table 2: Properties sold and rented out within 6 months
JDW rent - JDW sales JDW rent - Land Registry All
2006 98 165 259
2007 132 347 475
2008 56 214 270
2009 96 109 203
2010 163 224 384
Table 2 shows how many matches are retrieved in each year, and the average rent-price ratios.
Most matches come from the Land Registry. Some JDW matches are also found in the Land
Registry, so that the sum of the second and third column in the table is in some cases less than
the number in the third column. The low number of transactions in 2008 and 2009 causes the
number of matches to be low in those years. Moreover, since the available Land Registry data
on individual addresses covers only the 2006-2010 period, I concentrate only on those years
when analysing matched properties.8
8The 2005 file of the Land Registry does not contain individual addresses but only postcodes (corresponding
to 10-20 properties).
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Figure 4: Observations in the Matched Dataset
Notes: The continuous line represents the linear relation Price = 1000 × Weekly rent.
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Figure 4 plots rents and prices for the observations of the Matched Dataset. The plot on the
left contains all observations. Since the distribution of prices and rents is skewed to the right,
the axes use a log scale. Notice that, if price-rent ratios were the same for expensive and cheap
properties, the dots would cluster around a 45-degree line. The dots appear to follow a slope
greater than 1, which indicates that price-rent ratios are increasing in rents. To see this more
formally, consider the following regression:
log
(
Price
Rent
)
= α+ β log Rent (1)
where β represents d (log Price−log Rent)d logRent =
d log Price
d logRent − 1. Hence, a coefficient significantly greater
than zero indicates that the price-rent ratio is positively correlated with rents. Table 3 shows
the output of the regression in Equation 1. In the first column, the coefficient is positive and
significant, meaning that more valuable houses have lower rent-price ratios. The second column
displays the regression results when year dummies are added. Without these dummies, one
might suspect that years with a lower aggregate rent-price ratio also display higher rents, and
drive the results. As the table shows, however, adding year dummies leaves the coefficient on
log Rent virtually unchanged. Even controlling for year dummies, the regression in column 2
forces the coefficients on log Rent to be the same in all years. By interacting year dummies with
the log rents, it is possible to separate the different effects of log Rent for each year:
log
(
Price
Rent
)
= αt + βt log Rent
where βt is allowed to change from year to year. Results for the whole sample are displayed in
the fourth column of Table 3. Coefficients are positive and significant in all years except for
2008. This might be due to the exceptional nature of 2008 and the low number of observations.
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Table 3: Regression of price-rent ratios on rents (matched dataset)
log
(
Price
Rent
)
= α+ β log Rent
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Year dummies Year interactions
β 0.084∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014)
β2006 0.060
∗
(0.034)
β2007 0.060
∗∗
(0.026)
β2008 0.015
(0.039)
β2009 0.14
∗∗∗
(0.039)
β2010 0.13
∗∗∗
(0.030)
Year dummies X X
N 1,407 1,407 1,407
Moreover, coefficients are larger in later years, indicating an increasing divergence of price-rent
ratios across properties.
The right-hand side plot of Figure 4 zooms on properties with a weekly rent of less than £1000.
The axes follow now a linear scale, and the plot contains the same line as the first plot. Dots
seem to cluster around an increasing nonlinear pattern, with higher rents corresponding to much
higher prices. This nonlinearity is highlighted also by Garner and Verbrugge (2009) using data
from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey.
2.3 The Repeat Transactions Dataset
Some of the analyses carried out in Section 4 require to focus only on properties that appear
at least twice in the Sales or Rental datasets. Table 4 shows how many repeat observations
are contained in the JDW Dataset. Since the turnover in rental contracts is higher than the
turnover in owner occupation, repeat observations in Rentals are more common than repeat
observations in Sales. Appendix C shows that the proportion of repeat sales out of all sales in
the JDW Sales Dataset and the Land Registry look similar.
Table 4: Repeat transactions in the JDW Dataset
JDW Sales JDW Rentals
# Transactions Properties # Transactions Properties
1 17,921 1 24,651
2 1,049 2 5,774
3 45 3 1,594
4 430
5 102
6 18
7 6
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3 Main findings
3.1 Empirical Methodology
The log price of a house i at time t can be modeled as the sum of three elements:
pit = qi + λt + uit, (2)
where qi represents the quantity of housing services that the house provides (the “quality” of
the house), λt is the quality-adjusted price for one unit of housing services at time t, and uit
is an idiosyncratic shock centered around zero. The first term varies across properties but is
constant over time; the second term is constant across properties but varies over time; and the
third term captures property- and time-specific shocks.
Housing is a composite and heterogeneous good and every property represents a different com-
bination of characteristics. Hence qi can be decomposed as follows:
qi = Xiβ
∗ + Ziγ∗, (3)
where Xi is a vector of observed characteristics and Zi is a vector of unobserved characteristics.
This formulation is at the basis of the hedonic method (Court, 1939; Griliches, 1961). In
the context of housing, assuming that the market for properties is competitive and property
characteristics enter the utility function, the coefficients β∗ and γ∗ represent the shadow prices
of an additional unit of each characteristic (Rosen, 1974).
Similarly, λt can be decomposed as:
λt =
D∑
d=1
δd Timed, (4)
where Timed’s are dummy variables equal to 1 if d = t and 0 otherwise, and the δd’s represent
the coefficients on those dummies. By assumption, the prices of characteristics are held fixed
over time: all time variation is captured by λt. The sequence of estimated δn coefficients can
be interpreted as an index of log house prices. This regression is commonly referred to as the
“time-dummy” hedonic regression (Hill, 2012).
A more general model would include interactions between the characteristics included in Xi and
the Timed dummies. In section 4 I allow different categories of houses to have their own price
indexes, and define categories according to one or more of the characteristics included in Xi.
Pushing this argument forward, one could also allow the price of every observed characteristic
to change over time, making the aggregate price index λt redundant. At the end of this section I
briefly explore this formulation, which is equivalent to interacting all the elements of the vector
Xi with time dummies. In the main part of the analysis, I keep the prices of characteristics
fixed and stick to the time-dummy regression, which conveniently separates cross-sectional and
time variation. Since the analysed dataset covers only 7 years, from 2005 to 2011, changes in
the relative prices of characteristics are likely to be limited.
In empirical work the vector Zi is unobservable. The estimated model is therefore:
pit = α+Xiβ +
D∑
d=1
δd Timed + εit, (5)
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where α is a constant which serves the purpose of normalising the β and δ coefficients with
respect to a base category (e.g. 1-bedroom flats in the first quarter of 2005). The coefficients
estimated from equation 5 are affected by omitted variable bias (OVB). For instance, the coef-
ficient β is equal to β∗ + γ∗φX , where φX = (X ′X)−1X ′Z.
The dataset used in this paper contains information on both sale prices and rental prices. To
distinguish between the two, I use the subscripts s for sales and r for rentals. Equation 5
becomes:
phit = αh + βhXi + λht + uhit, (6)
where h ∈ {s, r} and λht =
∑D
d=1 δhd Timehd . This formulation allows for quality, quality-
adjusted prices, and errors to differ between sales and rentals.9 It is quite natural to expect
the estimated αs to be significantly higher than the estimated αr: on average, prices are higher
than rents. Similarly, one would expect λst’s to be different from λrt’s: aggregate prices and
rents might move differently over time, generating changes in the aggregate price-rent ratio
(Gallin, 2008; Campbell et al., 2009). Indeed, different coefficients in the price and rent hedonic
equations imply an effect of the regressors on price-rent ratios, because Eps−Epr = E(ps− pr),
and ps−pr is the log price-rent ratio. Hence, obtaining different estimates for the βs and the βr
is a nontrivial finding: it means that some property characteristics have an effect on price-rent
ratios.
Clearly, estimated coefficients are biased. Using the OVB formula, the difference between βs
and βr computed from the hedonic regressions is:
βs − βr = β∗s − β∗r + φXsγ∗s − φXrγ∗r
= β∗s − β∗r + (φXs − φXr)γ∗s + (γ∗s − γ∗r )φXr
where the final step is obtained by adding φXrγ
∗
s − φXrγ∗s = 0 to the equation. The difference
in the estimated coefficients is equal to the true difference in coefficients plus two terms—the
first depending on the different types of houses that belong to the sales and rentals datasets
(φXs − φXr), and the second depending on the different coefficients that regulate the relation
between unobserved characteristics and log prices or rents (γ∗s − γ∗r ).
The dataset used for the empirical analysis contains properties that were both sold and rented
within a short period of time. These observations can be helpful in reducing the OVB. For these
properties, the price-rent ratio can be directly observed and can serve as dependent variable in
the following regression:
yit = αm +Xiβm + λmt + εmit, (7)
which mimics the hedonic model and where yit = psit − prit. For these properties, φXs = φXr
so the bias in measuring the effect of property characteristics on price-rent ratios is reduced to
(γ∗s − γ∗r )φXr.
3.2 Results
I start the empirical analysis by estimating equation 6 separately for Sales and Rentals. The
vector of characteristics Xit contains: a dummy variable to indicate whether the property is a
house (as opposed to a flat); three dummy variables indicating the number of bedrooms of the
property: 2 bedrooms, 3 bedrooms, and 4 bedrooms or more10 (1-bedroom properties are the
9In what follows, I often refer to sale prices as “prices” and rental prices as “rents”.
10Only 2.5% of the properties in the sample have more than 4 bedrooms. Properties with more than 10
bedrooms are discarded as outliers
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baseline category); floor area measured in square feet; floor area squared, to take into account
the tendency of prices and rents to rise less than proportionally with size; and postcode district
dummies to capture the effects of local amenities. The estimated regression is therefore:
pit = α+ β1 House + β2 2-bed + β3 3-bed + β4 4-bed + β5 sqft + β6 sqft
2
+
Q∑
q=7
βq Postcodeq +
D∑
d=1
δd Timed + εit,
where I omit the subscript h to ease notation. I use quarterly dummies to construct a quarter-
by-quarter index of log house prices and rents (δst’s and δrt’s). Ferreira and Gyourko (2011)
employ a similar hedonic regression—only with sale prices—for their recent neighbourhood-level
analysis of the start of the US housing boom.
Table 5 shows the output of the hedonic regressions on the complete Sales and Rentals dataset in
columns 1 and 2. Column 3 computes the implied effect on price-rent ratios of the characteristics
X. The coefficients in column 3 are equal to the difference between the coefficients in column 1
and those in column 2. Equivalently, they can be computed by stacking together the sale and
rental prices in the same dataset and running the following regression:
pit = α+ pi0 Sale + β1 House + pi1 (House×Sale)
+β2 2-bed + pi2 (2-bed×Sale) + β3 3-bed + pi3 (3-bed×Sale)
+β4 4-bed + pi4 (4-bed×Sale)
+β5 sqft + pi5 (sqft×Sale) + β6 sqft2 + pi6 (sqft2×Sale)
+
Q∑
q=7
βq Postcodeq +
Q∑
q=7
piq (Postcodeq×Sale)
+
D∑
d=1
δd Timed +
D∑
d=1
ηd (Timed×Sale) + εit,
where Sale is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation refers to a sale, and 0 if the
observation refers to a rental. The pi and η coefficients measure the effect of certain variables on
the price-rent ratio. Finally, column 4 of Table 5 shows the output from estimating Equation
7 on the Matched Dataset. It is interesting to compare the coefficients in this column with the
ones computed in column 3.
Table 5 shows that, conditional on number of bedrooms and floor area, houses command a pos-
itive premium on sales but a small negative premium on rentals. Therefore, on average, houses
have higher price-rent ratios than flats. The effect is consistent with the hedonic regression on
the matched dataset. Conditional on floor area, the number of bedrooms has a higher effect on
Rentals than Sales. The contribution of floor area is positive, but more for prices than rents.
As expected, the coefficient on floor area squared is negative.11
In Table 5 I sort neighbourhoods from those with the highest price premium (SW3, Chelsea) to
those with the lowest one (SW6, Fulham)—the baseline postcode district is W2 (Paddington).
11The data allow me to measure gross price-rent ratios, i.e. price-rent ratios which do not take into account
maintenance expenses and, for rented properties, vacancies. If these were higher for smaller properties, net rent
yields (rent-price ratio net of costs) could be more similar than what suggested by their gross counterparts.
However, maintenance is commonly thought to be proportionally cheaper for smaller properties (Linneman,
1985). Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that more expensive properties stay vacant for longer.
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Table 5: Hedonic regressions
Notes: Quarterly time dummies used for the complete dataset and half-year dummies for the matched
dataset. The baseline property is a 1-bedroom flat in W2.
yhit = αh + βhXit + λht + εhit
2005–2011 2006–2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
JDW Sales JDW Rentals Implied Matched
y = ps y = pr (1) - (2) y = ps − pr
House 0.065∗∗∗ -0.014∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.033)
2-bed 0.118∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.002 0.027
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.027)
3-bed 0.090∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.033
(0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.045)
4-bed -0.083∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.066)
Floor area (sqft*10−3) 1.454∗∗∗ 1.160∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.067)
Floor area squared -0.156∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.015
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.017)
Postcode:
SW3 0.309∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.040)
SW7 0.288∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.041)
W8 0.245∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.044)
W1 0.189∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.081∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.044)
W11 0.123∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ -0.091
(0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.060)
SW1 0.123∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.000 0.119∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.036)
SW10 0.098∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.042)
SW5 0.074∗∗∗ -0.011 0.086∗∗∗ 0.080∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.047)
NW8 -0.004 -0.023 0.019 0.135∗∗
(0.015) (0.020) (0.025) (0.064)
SW8 -0.022 -0.004 -0.018 0.059
(0.019) (0.014) (0.023) (0.058)
NW1 -0.076∗∗∗ -0.029 -0.047∗∗ -0.054
(0.016) (0.020) (0.025) (0.060)
NW3 -0.067∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.092
(0.016) (0.017) (0.024) (0.096)
W14 -0.121∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.054
(0.015) (0.018) (0.024) (0.062)
W9 -0.162∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.050
(0.017) (0.029) (0.034) (0.084)
W10 -0.247∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.075∗ 0.085
(0.031) (0.047) (0.056) (0.116)
SW11 -0.275∗∗∗ -0.306∗∗∗ 0.031 0.060
(0.017) (0.020) (0.026) (0.092)
SW6 -0.285∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.061
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.061)
Time dummies X X X X
N 18,864 15,811 494
15
Figure 5: Price and rent indexes, price-rent ratios
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In terms of coefficients, both the complete JDW dataset and the Matched Dataset show that
more expensive neighbourhoods have higher price-rent ratios. In other words, both prices and
rents rise for more expensive neighbourhood, but prices rise more than rents. This fact is well
known by housing market practitioners.12
The results presented here demonstrate the consistency between the whole JDW dataset and
the small subsample of matched properties. Results (non-tabulated) show that the percentages
of 1-bed, 2-bed, 3-bed+ and houses among matched properties are similar to those in the JDW
rental dataset.
The left-hand side part of Figure 5 plots the coefficients on time dummies from the hedonic
regression in Sales (λst) and Rentals (λrt). In the boom period, prices grew at a rate approx-
imately double that of rents. After the peak at the end of 2007, the gap between prices and
rents has continued growing, albeit at a lower rate. During the sample period the correlation
of the two indexes is very high (90%). The different growth rates of prices and rents produced
increasing price-rent ratios—as shown in the right-hand side of Figure 5. The dashed line rep-
resents the price-rent ratios implied by the price and rent indexes. The solid line represents an
index of actual price-rent ratios computed from the Matched Dataset. The two samples give
similar results, although the matched sample is more volatile because of the smaller sample size.
3.3 Hedonic regressions with time-varying characteristic prices
Dropping the assumption of constant characteristic prices βh, the hedonic equation 6 becomes:
phit = βhtXi + uhit. (8)
According to this equation house prices are a combination of the time-varying prices of their
characteristics. The practical implementation of this approach consists in estimating equation
12See for instance “London buyers find streets paved with gold”, Financial Times, 13 March 2011.
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Figure 6: Time-varying hedonic prices
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8 for each period. The JDW Dataset contains 28 quarters. Using the 23 explanatory variables
listed in Table 5 (6 variables for physical characteristics and 17 dummies for postcode districts),
separately for sale and rental prices, produces 28×23×2 = 1288 coefficients. Figure 6 plots the
time evolution of some of these coefficients. Some quarters have a limited number of observations
and this generates volatile characteristic prices. Despite volatility, however, the main message
of these coefficients is consistent over time.
Houses enjoy a positive price premium and a negative rent premium with respect to flats.
However, Figure 6 shows that this differential has been declining over time. It is possible
that, in the aftermath of the housing bust, the demand for house purchases has declined and
has been substituted by an increase in demand for housing rentals. Figure 6 also confirms
that, conditional on floor area, rentals enjoy a premium for a high number of bedroom (4+).
Moreover, the price of a square foot has been rising over time for sales but has stayed constant
for rentals. This pattern is consistent with the general price and rent indexes in Figure 5,
which show a higher appreciation of prices in the 2005-2011 sample period. The last four
charts show the effect of location on prices and rents. It is clearly the case, in all periods, that
properties in prime neighbourhoods such as Chelsea (SW3) or Kensington (SW7) command a
bigger premium on sales than rentals. When analysing other neighbourhoods, such as Fulham
(SW6), the distinction between price and rent coefficients become much less clear or is reversed.
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4 Mechanisms
The previous section has shown that price-rent ratios are higher for bigger and better-located
properties. Higher price-rent ratios mean lower rental yields. In a well-functioning market
these differences in yields would be arbitraged away, unless they correspond to fundamental
differences in the investment characteristics of properties. In this section, I explore some possible
explanations for these differences. The goal is not to provide an exhaustive theory but to discuss
the plausibility of potential mechanisms.
In what follows, I distinguish between two groups of arguments: explanations based on hidden
costs and explanations based on asset pricing. Hidden costs create a wedge between gross yields
(which are measured in this paper) and net yields. It is possible that, while gross yields differ
across property categories, net yields are actually quite similar. Asset-pricing explanations take
the dividend discount model as starting point and try to rationalise differences in price-rent
ratios with differences in expected growth or discount factors. Neither hidden cost arguments
nor the traditional dividend pricing model are able to explain yield differences in a satisfactory
way. An alternative asset pricing model, where ownership is a hedge against rent risk (Sinai
and Souleles, 2005), seems more able to provide a framework consistent with the data.
My focus is on general explanations rather than explanations based on specific characteristics
of Central London—the presence of foreign buyers, for instance, or the importance of corporate
lettings in the market for big apartments. This is because the stylised fact illustrated in this
paper has been shown elsewhere in the UK (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1996; Association
of Residential Letting Agents, 2012) and in the US (Garner and Verbrugge, 2009). Thus, any
satisfying explanation cannot be London-specific. Likewise, I do not expand on behavioural
explanations—the fact that there might be a homeownership premium paid on top of the price
for housing services, and this premium might be positively correlated with size and location
prestige. These behavioural mechanisms might well play a role in Central London, but the
facts presented here are so persistent and general that a convincing explanation cannot rely on
behavioural arguments only.
4.1 Hidden costs: Gross vs. net yields
A first reason why there could be a wedge between gross and net yields is related to transaction
costs. There are fixed costs to be paid each time properties are bought or sold. If these fixed
cost do not rise proportionally with prices, flats would be subject to higher transaction costs,
in relative terms. They should then sell for a lower price, as a compensation, and this would
raise their yield.
A second possibility is that maintenance costs are higher for smaller and less central properties—
in equilibrium, then, their gross yields would have to be higher. Unfortunately, data on main-
tenance costs are not readily available. However, common sense suggests that maintenance
costs are proportionally higher for bigger properties. Linneman (1985) made the famous point
that managers of small properties can better exploit economies of scale. Moreover, in most
European cities, London included, properties in more expensive neighbourhoods are older, and
hence need more maintenance. Thus, it doesn’t seem likely that maintenance costs can explain
the differences in gross yields measured in the paper.
A third potential explanations refers to the fact that gross yields do not account for periods in
which rental properties are vacant. If small and less central properties are vacant for longer, this
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Table 6: Time on the market for rental properties
Notes: The table displays the output of regressing the days a property has been on the market (waiting for a new
tenant) on the log rent and the type of property (flat or house). Flats are the baseline category. All properties
are in the Chelsea-Fulham area in Central London.
(1) (2) (3)
Days Days logDays
Constant 89.920∗∗∗ 5.357 1.623∗∗∗
(3.550) (44.497) (0.320)
log Rent 12.525∗ 0.334∗∗∗
(6.908) (0.050)
House 28.692∗∗ 0.128
(11.854) (0.085)
Year dummies X X
N 2325 2325 2325
could explain the differences in yields. However, it is commonly believed that more expensive
properties stay on the market for longer—the higher the price, the more important it is to find
a good match with a buyer that likes the property. Despite the fact that the JDW Dataset
does not contain data on vacancies, It has been possible to retrieve vacancy data for a subset
of 2,325 rental properties marketed by John D Wood & Co. in the 2005-2011 period. Table 6
shows the results from regressing the number of days a property is waiting for a new tenant on
the log rent and the type of property (flat or house). This subset of the data confirms the belief
that more expensive properties stay on the market for longer periods. Moreover, conditional on
rent, houses are marketed for an average of 28 days more than flats.
It could be that, despite having longer vacancies when on the market, big properties are on
the market less often, i.e. tenants that use bigger properties stay for longer periods. This
possibility, acknowledged by Halket and Pignatti (2012), would increase the net yield of big
properties with respect to small properties. Again, it is extremely difficult to find data to prove
this claim. However, professional landlord or real estate investor associations often publish
estimates of net yields, which take into account maintenance costs and vacancies. The report
by Association of Residential Letting Agents (2012) shows that (1) prime Central London in
particular has a lower net yields than the rest of London and other UK regions, and (2) houses
have lower net yields than flats. Thus, it is difficult to explain the pattern in price-rent ratios
highlighted on the basis of transaction costs, maintenance costs, or vacancies.
4.2 Asset pricing: Expected appreciation and risk premia
The most basic asset pricing model is the dividend discount model, according to which the price
of an asset corresponds to the present discounted value of all its future dividends. In a real
estate context, this equivalence translates into a relation between the sale price of a property
and all its future rents, which in turn implies a link between the current price-rent ratio and
future rent expectations. Properties with higher price-rent ratios should feature higher expected
rent growth, higher expected returns (i.e. risk premia), or both (Campbell et al., 2009). The
previous section has shown that size and location are positively correlated with price-rent ratios.
Hence, big and better-located properties should display higher rent growth or be associated with
lower volatility.
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Figure 7: Growth and Volatility by Housing Categories
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Aggregate evidence To check whether the empirical findings are consistent with the divi-
dend discount model, I create two housing category classifications. In terms of size, I divide
observations into: 1-bedroom flats, 2-bedroom flats, 3-or-more-bedroom flats, and houses. The
summary statistics in Table 1 show the dimension of these groups with respect to the over-
all dataset. In terms of location, I divide observations into prime neighbourhoods and other
neighbourhoods. Prime neighbourhoods are the most expensive six postcode districts in the
hedonic regression of Table 5: SW3 (Chelsea), SW7 (South Kensington), W8 (Holland Park),
W1 (Mayfair), W11 (Notting Hill), SW1 (Belgravia and Pimlico). In the JDW Dataset, prime
neighbourhoods correspond to 53% of Sales and 54% of Rentals. I take equation 6 and allow
the coefficients on property characteristics to differ across categories:
phct = αhc +Xicβhc + λhct + εhct, (9)
where c denotes a category of properties. This is equivalent to interacting the category dummy
with all property characteristics. The average growth rate for a given property category c is
E(λhct+1 − λhct) and the corresponding aggregate risk is Var(λhct+1 − λhct).
Figure 7 plots the λhct’s over the different quarters t, estimated using equation 9. The upper
part of the figure shows results according to the first category classification, based on physical
characteristics. Consistently with the housing-ladder model of Ortalo-Magne´ and Rady (2006),
20
Table 7: Prices and rents: Growth and systemic risk
phct = αhc +Xicβhc + λhct + εhct,
JDW Sales Dataset JDW Rentals Dataset
E(λct+1 − λct) St.Dev.(λct+1 − λct) E(λct+1 − λct) St.Dev.(λct+1 − λct)
All 0.022 0.042 0.011 0.033
1-bed Flats 0.019 0.045 0.010 0.036
2-bed Flats 0.022 0.051 0.010 0.034
3-bed+ Flats 0.023 0.059 0.010 0.059
Houses 0.024 0.053 0.013 0.070
Prime neighbourhood 0.023 0.052 0.011 0.039
Other neighbourhood 0.020 0.039 0.011 0.032
the prices of bigger houses grew more in the 2005-2007 boom period. This trend was partially
reversed during the brief bust of 2008 but restarted immediately after. In terms of rents, the
pattern is the same but more pronounced: the rent volatility of bigger properties is clearly
higher. A similar impression is given by the prime vs non-prime neighbourhood sale price
comparison at the bottom left of Figure 7. Sale prices in prime neighbourhoods have grown
more but are also more volatile. However, rents have behaved very similarly in prime and other
neighbourhoods, both in terms of growth and volatility.
Table 7 lists the average growth and volatilities of the different property categories and confirms
the impressions gathered from Figure 7. In particular, the standard deviation of rents for houses
is twice that for 2-bed flats. The numbers in Table 7 imply that it is difficult to rationalise the
observed differences in price-rent ratios using the dividend pricing model. First, rent growth
in the 2005–2011 period was not substantially higher for bigger or better-located properties.
Second, for these properties aggregate rent volatility was significantly more pronounced, which
is inconsistent with their risk premium being lower.
Evidence from repeat sales and rentals Table 7 shows results on the volatiltiy of aggregate
indices, not individual properties. The balance sheet of most homeowners contains just one
property (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002), and most renters are obviously subject to just one
rental contract (Genesove, 2003).13 Idiosyncratic volatility might be more relevant than its
aggregate counterpart. To measure idiosyncratic volatility, I restrict my attention to properties
that sold or rented at least twice during the sample period. Suppose we observe the price of
one of these properties (i) at time T and t. Differencing Equation 6 gives the log appreciation
of property i:
phiT − phit = λhT − λht︸ ︷︷ ︸
aggregate
movement
+uhiT − uhit︸ ︷︷ ︸
idiosyncratic
movement
. (10)
Equation 10 constitutes the basis of the repeat sales method (Bailey et al., 1963; Case and
Shiller, 1989), which allows for the estimation of the term uhiT − uhit. Simlarly to aggregate
risk, idiosyncratic risk is defined as Var(uit+1 − uit). Case and Shiller (1989) assume that
uit = vit + hit, where vit is a white noise with mean zero and variance σ
2
v , and hit is a random
walk with mean zero and variance tσ2h. Under these assumptions, Var(uiT−uit) = 2σ2v+σ2h(T−t)
13According to the U.K. Wealth and Assets Survey, only 10% of households own property other than their
main residence. Similary, the English Private Landlord Survey of 2010 reveals that 78% of landlords owns just
one property for rent.
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Figure 8: Hedonic and repeat sales indices
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and Var(uit+1 − uit) = 2σ2v + σ2h. Case and Shiller employ these volatility estimates to improve
the efficiency of the repeat sales regression and call their approach the weighted repeat sales
estimator (WRS).14
Figure 8 compares the WRS indices estimated on the JDW Dataset with the hedonic indices
estimated before. The WRS index for sale prices displays a significantly steeper appreciation
than the corresponding hedonic index. This difference might be due to that fact that, to be
included in the repeat sales regression, a property must have sold twice between 2005 and
2011, a relatively short period. Property that resell quickly have usually undergone substantial
improvements, or belong to a seller who has received a particularly good offer.15 One way to
limit this problem is to exclude properties whose “holding period” (the time between two sales)
is below a certain threshold. I choose a threshold of 1000 days (corresponding to approximately
3 years). The result is displayed in the left-hand side of Figure 8: the WRS index with no close
transitions appreciates less than the unadjusted WRS index, but still more than the original
hedonic index.
By contrast, when measuring the index for rental prices, the series computed through repeat
transactions is smoother and shows a lower appreciation rate than the one measured through
the hedonic method. The different behaviour of the repeat rent index with respect to the repeat
sales index is consistent with the findings of Genesove (2003) who uses data from the American
Housing Survey and shows that rents on the same units are sticky, especially when tenants do
not change. Moreover, since landlords tend to postpone maintenance works, repeat rents on
the same unit suffer from unaccounted depreciation. Again, one can limit the selection bias by
14In practice, the Case and Shiller (1989)’s procedure involves three steps: first, running an OLS regression to
estimate Equation 10; second, regressing the resulting residuals on a constant (which will provide an estimate
2σ2u) and the (T − t) term (which will provide an estimate for σ2h); third, estimating Equation 10 again running
a GLS regression where observations are weighted by the inverse of the square root of the predicted residuals.
15A substantial literature (e.g. Clapp and Giaccotto, 1992; Goetzmann and Spiegel, 1995) addresses the issue
of sample selection bias in repeat sales indices—an issue that is especially important when indices are estimated
over short periods of time.
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excluding from the sample rental contracts that are too close from each other. To be consistent
with the procedure adopted for the price index, I choose the same threshold of 1000 days. The
resulting WRS index with minimum holding period is closer to the hedonic index than the
unadjusted WRS index.
I compute separate WRS regressions to estimate idiosyncratic volatilities for different property
categories. For some categories the number of repeat sales is low, but this is less of a problem
for rents, because repeat rents are more common than repeat sales. Table 8 shows the outcome
of running the regression described by equation 10, using both the unadjusted WRS procedure
(upper panel) and the WRS with minimum holding period of 1000 days (lower panel). The WRS
with a minimum holding period relies on significantly smaller samples; nevertheless, coefficients
under both approaches are similar. The output of Table 8 mirrors the results on aggregate
volatility. Bigger houses and expensive neighbourhoods have higher idiosyncratic volatility,
although the distinction between prime and non-prime neighbourhoods is less sharp than the
distinction between big and small properties.
Survey evidence The difficulty of reconciling these results with the dividend discount model
might be due to the way in which expectations are measured. The analysis so far has followed
the common practice of studying the historical trend of economic variables and then assume
that expectations reflect this trend. An alternative approach would be to measure people’s
expectations directly. John D Wood & Co., whose Sale and Rental Dataset is used in the
present analysis, conducts every six months an online survey of the members of its mailing
list.16 The last survey (January 2012) contains a couple of questions on local price and rent
expectations:
The next few questions are about nominal house prices in the area where you live.
Please enter the first part of your postcode:
- In terms of nominal value, what do you think will happen to house prices in your
area after 1 year?
- In terms of nominal value, what do you think will happen to rents in your area
after 1 year?
Both expectation questions are followed by a drop-down menu where the respondents can choose
a percentage. Figure 9 shows the frequency of each answer.
The question on postcodes aims at identifying the postcode district of the respondent. I divide
respondents into three groups: those living in the UK outside London, those living in London
but not in a prime neighbourhood, and those living in a London prime neighbourhood.17 The
definition of prime neighbourhood is the same as the one in the rest of the paper, namely an
address belonging to the following six postcode districts: SW1, SW3, SW7, W1, W8, W11.
With this information, I can check whether the high price-rent ratios of prime neighbourhoods
are correlated with high price or rent growth expectations, in accordance with the dividend
pricing model.18 Since there are no explicit questions on rent risk, I take the dispersion of rent
16House price expectations are rarely surveyed. This is contrast with inflation expectations, which are regualrly
surveyed by Central Banks and other institutions (Mankiw et al., 2004).
17The question on the postcode appears at the very beginning of the survey and 95% of people that clicked
on the survey link filled that question. A few respondents live outside the UK, and are excluded from the
present statistics. The last part of the questionnaire contains questions on the socio-demographic characteristics
of respondents. A table with summary statistics is shows in Appendix B.
18The survey makes no distinction between properties with different physical characteristics, e.g. flats vs
houses. Hence, I can only test the part of results that relates to differences between neighbourhoods, not the one
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Table 8: Prices and rents: Idiosyncratic risk
Notes: The table shows the coefficients obtained by estimating the second stage of the WRS method of Case and
Shiller (1989). The coefficient θ1 is positive in the rent equations but negative in the price equation. While at
odds with the Case and Shiller (1989)’s model, it is not uncommon to estimate negative θ1’s in empirical work
(Calhoun, 1996). These negative coefficients imply that very close transactions have high idiosyncratic volatility.
ν2cht = θc0 + θc1(T − t)
JDW Sales Dataset JDW Rentals Dataset
θc0 θc1 Obs. θc0 θc1 Obs.
Panel A: WRS
All 0.077∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ 1,139 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 10,786
(0.008) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
1-bed Flats 0.048∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗ 176 0.010∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 3,965
(0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003)
2-bed Flats 0.077∗∗∗ -0.033 286 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 4,007
(0.022) (0.020) (0.001) (0.002)
3-bed+ Flats 0.056∗∗∗ -0.006 201 0.007∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 1,147
(0.011) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Houses 0.066∗∗∗ -0.011 395 0.010∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 1,450
(0.010) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
Prime neighbourhood 0.084∗∗∗ -0.018 703 0.009∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 6,465
(0.013) (0.012) (0.001) (0.002)
Other neighbourhood 0.057∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ 435 0.011∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 4,321
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Panel B: WRS with minimum holding period of 1000 days
All 0.053∗∗∗ -0.008 512 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 2,390
(0.018) (0.012) (0.006) (0.004)
1-bed Flats 0.022 -0.005 77 0.004 0.008∗∗ 771
(0.014) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
2-bed Flats 0.0087 0.008 133 0.014∗ 0.004 879
(0.016) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005)
3-bed+ Flats 0.073∗ -0.024 80 0.006 0.015∗ 288
(0.038) (0.024) (0.013) (0.009)
Houses 0.049 -0.004 197 0.024 0.006 381
(0.033) (0.021) (0.021) (0.014)
Prime neighbourhood 0.056∗∗ -0.005 296 0.008 0.011∗∗ 1,470
(0.027) (0.017) (0.007) (0.005)
Other neighbourhood 0.032∗∗ -0.004 214 0.014 0.006 916
(0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)
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Figure 9: Survey expectations
Notes: The questions are “In terms of nominal value, what do you think will happen to house prices in your
area after 1 year?” and “In terms of nominal value, what do you think will happen to rents in your area after 1
year?” The answers are the bottom and top of the range are “-10% or more” and “+10% or more”.
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expectations as a measure of rent uncertainty. This approach is consistent with the empirical
literature that looks at disagreement about inflation (Mankiw et al., 2003) or the stock market
(Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003). Figure 9 shows that disagreement about house prices and rents can
be substantial: taken together, respondents fill almost the entire range of possible answers, with
round numbers (“-10% or more”, “-5%”, “0%”, “+5%”, “+10% or more”) being chosen more
often.19
The upper half of Table 9 shows the differences in price and rent expectations between prime and
other neighbourhoods. To provide another relevant comparison, the lower half of the table shows
the same differences between London and other parts of the UK. In terms of price expectations,
respondents in prime neighbourhoods are slightly more optimistic than other Londoners, but the
difference is not significant. By contrast, Londoners are significantly more optimistic than other
respondents in the UK, consistently with the different performances of the UK housing market
inside and outside London in the last years.20 In terms of rent expectations, people living in the
non-prime neighbourhoods of London expect slightly higher growth (the difference is significant
at the 10% level). Londoners in general expect higher rent growth than non Londoners. The
standard deviation of rent expectations is significantly higher for prime London than other parts
of London and the same is true for the London vs Outside London comparison.
Therefore, according to the survey, rent uncertainty is higher for London prime neighbourhoods
but expected rent growth is not. This is again inconsistent with the dividend discount model.
Clearly, the evidence presented here is only suggestive. Nevertheless, the respondents to this
survey are people on the mailing list of a Central London real estate agency: their opinions are
likely to be representative of the buyers and sellers of this particular housing market.
regarding differences between properties of different sizes.
19This is a common feature of expectation surveys (Hudomiet et al., 2011).
20See “How did London get away with it?”, CentrePiece, Winter 2010/2011 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/cp333.pdf).
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Table 9: Survey results
Notes: The questions are “In terms of nominal value, what do you think will happen to house prices in your
area after 1 year?” and “In terms of nominal value, what do you think will happen to rents in your area after 1
year?”
Price Expectations (Etpst+1) Rent Expectations (Etprt+1)
Mean (St. Dev.) Obs. Coeff. (St. Dev.) Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
London, prime neighbourhood 2.25 (4.37) 79 2.84 (3.81) 74
London, other neighbourhood 2.10 (4.14) 189 3.78 (3.38) 183
Mean Diff. (T-test) 0.15 (0.58) -0.94∗ (0.51)
StDev Ratio (F-test) 1.12 1.28∗
London 2.15 (4.20) 268 3.51 (3.53) 257
Outside London 0.20 (3.58) 200 2.67 (2.97) 191
Mean Diff. (T-test) 1.95∗∗∗ (0.36) 0.84∗∗∗ (0.31)
StDev Ratio (F-test) 1.37∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗
As noted by Sinai and Souleles (2005), the traditional dividend pricing model ignores that
housing is a necessary consumption good and all households must either rent or own. From this
perspective, higher rent volatility might increase the demand for housing, because it induces
people to choose homeownership as a way to insure against future rent changes. In places with
inelastic housing supply, such as London, this insurance motive results in higher price-rent ratios
rather than higher homeownership rates. Sinai and Souleles (2005) show that, consistently with
this model, higher rent volatility is associated with higher price-rent ratios across US cities. In
this paper I use data from London to show that their finding also holds within cities, at the
submarket level. In Central London, households looking for small properties face thick markets
both in sales and rentals. By contrast, households looking for big properties face a thin rental
market and are pushed toward buying. Thin markets are more volatile and, as in Ngai and
Tenreyro (2009), are less likely to generate good matches between property characteristics and
people’s tastes. While Ngai and Tenreyro look at the thick vs thin market distinction over time,
I look at it over the cross-section of property types.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents novel findings on house prices and rents at the individual-property level.
Price-rent ratios are shown to be higher for bigger properties and properties located in more
expensive neighbourhoods.
The main contribution of this paper is the empirical methodology, which consists of two steps:
first, I run hedonic regressions on both price and rent data and check if there are statistically
significant differences in the coefficients. Second, to avoid any bias caused by unobserved het-
erogeneity between sale and rental properties, I restrict the analysis on those properties for
which it is possible to observe a sale and a rental during a short time span (6 months). By
measuring prices and rents on the same property at approximately the same time, I can regress
price-rent ratios on the same characteristics used in the hedonic regression and compare the
estimated coefficients. Reassuringly, the coefficients obtained under the two methods are very
similar.
While the main objective of this work is empirical, in the last part of the paper I explore several
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possible theoretical explanations for the stylised fact that I uncover. I divide the potential
mechanisms in two groups: explanations based on the difference between gross and net yields,
and explanations based on asset pricing. I measure rent risk at both the aggregate and individual
level, and find that, in accordance with the hedging model of Sinai and Souleles (2005), the
properties with higher price-rent ratios are those with higher rent risk.
Consistently with the finance literature, I measure risk as price volatility, which is also the
approach of Sinai and Souleles. However, the hedging model leaves open the possibility that
other kinds of risk play a role in the renting vs. buying decision. For instance, search costs: a
household looking for a 4-bedroom house to rent is not only worried about changes in rental
prices, but also about finding a 4-bedroom house to rent. Moreover, households might differ in
their risk preferences. Workers whose income covaries positively with rents are less sensitive to
rent volatility (Ortalo-Magne´ and Rady, 2002). Families with children—who usually demand
bigger properties—are more risk averse (Banks et al., 2010). Future research should expand on
these different aspects of rent risk and housing market liquidity.
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Appendices
A Housing Statistics for Central-Western London
The first two columns of Table A1 refer to the London local authorities covered by the JDW
Dataset (Camden, Westminster, Kensington and Chelsea, Hammersmith and Fulham, and
Wandsworth), the third and the fourth columns refer to the whole London area, and the fifth
and sixth columns refer to England.
The upper panel takes data on sales from the 2011 Land Registry. In England as a whole,
houses constitute 81% of sales, whereas they are only half of sales in London, and only one
quarter of sales in Central-Western London. The median sale price in Central-Western London
is more than two times and a half the median English price.
The middle panel takes data on housing tenure from the 2001 Census. Going from England to
London and then to Central-Western London, the percentage of owner occupied properties goes
down, and the percentage of privately rented properties goes up. A quarter of properties in
Central-Western London belong to the privately rented market. The percentage of properties
rented by a social landlord (either a local authority or a registered housing association) is also
higher in London and Central-Western London.
The bottom panel takes data on house building from the U.K. Communities and Local Gov-
ernment Department.21 (These data are not available at the local authority level). The figures
show that, both in England and London, house building tend to focus more on flats than houses,
compared to the composition of the existing stock. Within flats, most of the building activity
is centered on 2-bedroom flats.
Table A1: General Housing Statistics
Cent.-West London London England
# % # % # %
Sales (Land Registry 2011)
Flats 12,318 0.75 46,832 0.51 121,092 0.19
Houses 4,148 0.25 44,891 0.49 504,909 0.81
(Median price) (£480,000) (£287,000) (£185,000)
Stock (Census 2001)
Owner occupied 188,191 0.44 1,675,690 0.58 13,920,429 0.71
Rented from private landlord 108,084 0.25 432,482 0.15 1,798,864 0.09
Rented from social landlord 132,352 0.31 790,371 0.27 3,940,728 0.20
New supply (Local statistics 2001–2011)
1-bedroom flats 46,658 0.24 137,006 0.09
2-bedroom flats No statistics 106,506 0.54 413,902 0.29
3-bedroom+ flats at Borough level 10,433 0.05 14,421 0.01
Houses 35,237 0.18 879,721 0.61
21http://www.communities.gov.uk/housing/housingresearch/housingstatistics/housingstatisticsby/
housebuilding/livetables/.
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B Summary statistics for expectation survey respondents
The January 2012 John D Wood & Co. online survey of expectations asked respondents for
many demographic information, which are summarised below. Respondents are mostly males,
married with children, graduated, and homeowners. The sample is not representative of the
general UK population, but is reasonably consistent with the expected profile of a home buyer
in Central London.
The characteristics in Panel A were asked at the beginning of the online questionnaire, while the
characteristics in Panel B were asked at the end. It is common for a percentage of respondents of
online questionnaires to drop out of the survey before the end. This explains the lower number
of observations for characteristics listed in Panel B.
Table B1: Summary statistics
Variable % Obs. Variable % Obs.
Panel A: Housing
Residence Housing tenure
Outside UK 0.07 510 Homeowner (mortgage) 0.50 451
UK outside London 0.47 510 Homeowner (outright) 0.33 451
London, prime neighbourhood 0.16 510 Renting 0.01 451
London, other neighbourhood 0.30 510 Other 0.16 451
Panel B: Socio-demographic characteristics
Gender Age
Male 0.69 293 Less than 31 0.06 294
31-40 0.32 294
41-50 0.25 294
Marital status 51-60 0.20 294
Single 0.15 294 61-70 0.15 294
Cohab. (child) 0.03 294 Over 70 0.02 294
Cohab. (no child) 0.06 294
Married (child) 0.50 294 Income
Married (no child) 0.16 294 Hhold income <£50,000 0.11 278
Separated/divorced 0.07 294 £50,000-100,000 0.29 278
Widowed 0.02 294 £100,000-200,000 0.30 278
Over £200,000 0.29 278
Education Occupation
GSCE 0.05 295 Student 0.01 297
A-level / Bacc. 0.09 295 Employed 0.56 297
University degree 0.43 295 Self-employed 0.23 297
Masters 0.32 295 Looking for a job 0.01 297
PhD 0.04 295 Retired 0.12 297
Other 0.06 295 Other 0.08 297
C Comparing the JDW Sales Dataset with the U.K. Land Reg-
istry
This part of the Appendix studies the subset of observations in the Land Registry that belong
to the postcode districts listed in Table 1.
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Figure C1: Quarterly registered sales (Land Registry)
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Table C1: Property characteristics (Land Registry)
2005-2010
Median price 427,948
(in 2005 £)
Flat (%) 0.81
Terraced house (%) 0.16
Semi-detached house (%) 0.02
Detached house (%) 0.01
Newly built (%) 0.06
Total observations 71,459
Table C2: Repeat sales (Land Registry, 2006–2010)
Dataset Units that appear
. . . times
Land Registry sales 1 52,167
2 2,650
3 117
4 4
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Figure C2: Price indices (Land Registry)
Notes: Indices are normalised to zero in 2006Q1, starting date of the repeat sales index. The hedonic index
is computed using the two variables available in the Land Registry: property type (flat, terraced house, semi-
detached house, and detached house) and whether the property is new.
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